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ABSTRACT
Real-time information technology facilitates more
efficient channels of communication. As communication
becomes nearly instantaneous and further reaching, it
seems probable that more expression will fall within the
scope of cyberharassment and cyberstalking laws.
Attorneys who represent clients indicted on such criminal
charges need to familiarize themselves with possible
defenses. This Article suggests invoking the overbreadth
doctrine to exonerate a client who is charged with violating
the federal cyberstalking statute.
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INTRODUCTION
Twitter is a real-time information network that allows people to
receive and send news and information instantly. 2 These
dispatches are termed “tweets” and are limited to 140 characters in
length. 3 Persons with Twitter accounts may elect to receive tweets
from other account holders. 4 This is known as “following” and
effectively allows a user to subscribe to select releases of
information. 5 Tweets are public but users can also send private
messages amongst themselves. 6
Twitter is a global phenomenon that provides its service in over
twenty different languages and is expected to have over one billion
registered users by the end of 2013. 7 With such an explosion in
use, people may increasingly rely upon the legal system as
recourse to halting harassment and stalking conducted through
tweets. As with other forms of speech, one may incur criminal
liability through the use of Twitter. Indeed, tweets have fallen and
will continue to fall within the scope of state and federal
cyberstalking statutes. 8
2

https://twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Dominic Rushe, Icelandic MP Fights US Demand for her Twitter
Account Details, THE GUARD. (Jan. 8, 2011).
7
https://twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2012); Claire Miller &
Brad Stone, Hacker Exposes Private Twitter Documents, BITS (July 15, 2009).
8
See, e.g., United States v. Sayer, Nos. 2:11-CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47DBH, 2012 WL 1714746 (D. Me. May 15, 2012); Johnson v. Arlotta, No. 27cv-10-21534 (D. Minn. Dec. 12, 2011) (unpublished).
3
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Interstate communication through an Internet service like
Twitter may implicate on such statute in particular: the federal
cyberstalking statute. When this occurs, substantial First
Amendment issues may come into play. Subsection A of this
Article discusses the federal cyberstalking statute in further detail.
Section I provides a quick First Amendment refresher. Section II
provides examples of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine as
a potential defense to the cyberstalking statute by examining two
cases involving the use of Twitter.
I. TWITTER AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY
In response to the growing number of crimes against women,
Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”). 9
As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed in United States v.
Page, 10 Congress recognized the severe toll that such crimes
impose upon society. VAWA provides, inter alia, funding for the
investigation and prosecution of violent crimes against women.
Congress reauthorized VAWA in 2000, 2005, 11 and 2013. 12
A. The Cyberstalking Statute
In 1996, Congress passed the original interstate stalking
statute—codifed as 18 U.S.C. § 2261A—as part of VAWA. 13 The
statute criminalized the of use of the postal service, or any channel
of interstate commerce, to engage in a course of conduct that
purposefully placed another person in reasonable fear of death or
serious injury. 14
The rise of the Internet created a new medium for stalking
behavior, and stalking became more common than ever before.
According to Department of Justice statistics, victim reports of
9

Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1069(a), 110 Stat. 2422, 2655 (1996).
167 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 1999).
11
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
12
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th
Cong. (2013).
13
See Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1069(a), 110 Stat. 2422, 2655 (1996).
14
Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1107(b)(1), 114 Stat. 1464, 1498 (2000); see, e.g.,
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009).
10
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stalking increased from 1.4 million in 1998 to 3.4 million in
2009. 15 In response, Congress amended § 2261A in 2006,
broadening the reach of the statute to encompass stalking behavior
conducted through Internet computer services. 16 Congress also
criminalized courses of conduct perpetrated with the intent to
harass. 17 To violate the statute, the alleged cyberharassment need
not cause a reasonable fear of death or serious injury, as was
required under the original law. Instead, purposeful conduct that
leads to another’s substantial emotional distress is now sufficient
to violate § 2261A. 18
By lowering the threshold from purposeful conduct that leads
to emotional distress, i.e., intent to harass, Congress has broadened
the cyberstalking statute to ensnare simple expression that may be
subjectively understood as purposeful conduct meant to harass.
Consequently, a defense that relies upon the protections of the First
Amendment may be compelling.
B. Applicable First Amendment Doctrine
The First Amendment issues involved in raising a cyberstalking
defense include the level of review, the tension between conduct
and speech, the captive audience doctrine, the distinction between
public and private speech, and the nature of facial and as-applied
challenges.
1. Standard of Review
The standard of review for laws restricting speech varies. 19
Courts often employ the term “heightened scrutiny” in reviewing
15

Melvin Huang, Keeping Stalkers at Bay In Texas, 15 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R.
53, 55 (2009).
16
Pub. L. No. 109–162, § 114(a), 119 Stat. 2690, 2987 (2006) (making it a
crime “to kill, injure, harass, or place under surveillance with intent to kill,
injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person
in another state or tribal jurisdiction or within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States . . . .”).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
See, e.g., DAVID S. SCHWARTZ & LORI A. RINGHAND, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 936 (2012).
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content-based restrictions on speech. 20 Laws that restrict speech
based on content deserve special scrutiny because such laws act as
prior restraints, in effect, chilling freedom of expression—a
constitutionally guaranteed right. 21
Although freedom of expression is not unlimited, even contentneutral regulations must pass intermediate scrutiny. 22 For example,
emotionally distressing speech may be entitled to “special
protection” under the First Amendment. 23 This is important to note
when considering the broad applications of the cyberstalking
statute.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the justification or the
purpose of the statute will control whether such restrictions are
content-based. 24 If a law restricts speech due to its content, a court
will then determine whether the speech falls within the narrow
exceptions to First Amendment Protection: obscenity, 25
defamation, 26 fraud, 27 incitement, 28 true threats, 29 or speech
integral to criminal conduct. 30 If speech falls within these
20

United States v. Bell, 303 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Byrne v.
Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 2010)).
21
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 3776–77 (1968). Even
though the law at issue in O’Brien did not restrict speech based on content, the
Court nevertheless asked whether the government could establish that: (1) the
law was within the constitutional power of the Government, (2) it furthered an
important or substantial governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest was
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) that the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms was no greater than required to
further that interest.
23
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (“[If such] speech was at
a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special
protection’ under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”).
24
RODNEY A. SMOLLER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:5 (1989) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
25
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
26
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–55 (1952).
27
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 752 (1976).
28
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam).
29
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
30
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
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categories, a court will inquire into whether the law that restricts
such speech is substantially overbroad. 31
2. Conduct and Speech
The Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. O’Brien 32 has
set the standard for courts that review regulations that impact
speech for reasons unrelated to the content of expression. 33 In
applying O’Brien, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument
that conduct could be interpreted as speech whenever the conduct
is intended to convey a message. 34 First Amendment protection
does extend, however, to conduct that is “inherently
expressive” 35—such as flag burning, which does not require
accompanying speech to explain the message. 36
3. Captive Audience
In public spaces—generally, most places outside of the
home—the burden is on the viewer to avert her eyes from
offensive protected speech. 37 For example, in Erzonik v.
Jacksonville, 38 the Supreme Court struck down as facially invalid a
regulation prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from displaying
nudity on screens that were viewable to the public from sidewalks.
This principle applies to billboard advertisements as well. 39 The
rationale for this doctrine is that in a society committed to
individual freedom, a certain amount of “expressive disorder” must
be protected to ensure that a free society will continue. 40
31

SCHWARTZ & RINGHAND, supra note 19.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
33
SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 9:1.
34
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 65-66 (2006).
35
Id.
36
Id. (distinguishing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)).
37
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 948
(2d ed. 1988).
38
422 U.S. 205 (1975).
39
See, e.g., New York Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.2d 123 (2d
Cir. 1998).
40
City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 472 (1987).
32
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4. Public and Private Speech
Another important consideration is the distinction between
public and private speech. 41 Decades ago, Alexander Meiklejohn
argued that absolute freedom of speech should apply only to
matters relating to self-governance because such speech is directed
at the common good. 42 By contrast, speech conveyed for
individual benefit should not necessarily enjoy the absolute
protections of the First Amendment. 43
5. Facial and As-Applied Challenges
To avoid a chilling effect upon speech, courts have invalidated
laws held to be overly broad. 44 A statute may be overbroad on its
face if there are a substantial number of applications that are
unconstitutional as judged in relation to the statute’s legitimate
purpose. 45 In essence, a facial overbreadth challenge is a forwardlooking argument that seeks to prevent enforcement of the statute
in the future. Facial challenges are disfavored because they rest on
mere predictions and run counter to the theory of judicial
restraint. 46
By contrast, an “as-applied” challenge seeks only to redress a
specific constitutional violation. Accordingly, an as-applied
challenge is appropriate when a person’s constitutional rights have
been violated by the enforcement of a facially constitutional law or
regulation. As a practical matter, it may be expedient to first argue

41

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 94 (1948).
42
Id. at 88-89.
43
Id.
44
The “‘overbreadth doctrine’ is derived in part from the elemental
proposition that ‘a litigant has always had the right to be judged in accordance
with a constitutionally valid rule of law.’” 1 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24,
§ 6.4 (quoting Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (1981)).
45
See, e.g., Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008).
46
See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (“The delicate power
of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with
reference to hypothetical cases thus imagined.”).
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facial overbreadth and then raise an as-applied challenge in the
alternative.
II.

EXAMPLES OF RECENT OVERBREADTH CHALLENGES
INVOLVING TWITTER

Heightened scrutiny, in its various forms, operates to ensure
that if speech is to be restricted based on its content, such
restrictions are narrowly tailored to restrict only unprotected
speech. 47 Courts demand that laws restricting speech refrain from
unnecessarily proscribing protected speech 48 because “[p]recision
of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching
our most precious freedoms.” 49 Courts have insisted that this
rationale applies not only to traditional forms of expression, but to
Internet communication as well. 50 Thus, the constitutional
protections available to other forms of communication are also
applicable to Twitter.
Because § 2261A may be construed as a content-based
restriction on speech insofar as the statute acts to limit persons
from broadcasting harassing expression, a solid defense should
begin with an argument that the statute is subject to heightened
scrutiny. A court may hold the statute unconstitutional if it is not
narrowly tailored to restrict only unprotected speech. Alternately,
the court may invalidate the statute as applied to the defendant if
the defense can show that its application violated the defendant’s
constitutional right to free speech.
A. Cassidy and Sayer
Two recent cases demonstrate the divergent results of
overbreadth attacks. The first case, United States v. Cassidy,51
47

SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 2:66 .
See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
49
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
50
See, e.g., United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582 (D. Md.
2011) (quoting in part Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)) (“Online
speech is equally protected under the First Amendment as there is ‘no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied’ to
online speech.”).
51
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011).
48
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demonstrates a successful overbreadth attack. The second, United
States v. Sayer, 52 illustrates an unsuccessful attempt.
1. Cassidy: A Successful Overbreadth Argument
In 2011, the District Court of Maryland, in United States v.
Cassidy, granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that
§2261A, as applied to the defendant, criminalized protected
speech. 53
According to an affidavit submitted to the district court: the
defendant (“Cassidy”), under an assumed name, befriended a
female Buddhist leader named Alyce Zeoli (“A.Z.”) at her
Buddhist retreat. 54 Cassidy received end-of-life care from the
Buddhist monks who were led to believe that he was succumbing
to stage IV lung cancer. 55 Cassidy proposed to A.Z. and was
rebuffed. 56 He also asked A.Z. “if she wanted him to kill her exhusband,” in response to which “A.Z. requested that her exhusband not be harmed.” 57 When A.Z. discovered that Cassidy was
not in fact suffering from terminal cancer, she confronted him. 58
Subsequently, Cassidy left the retreat with a Buddhist nun. 59 He
then set up a fake Twitter account titled “Vajragul” through which
he directed over 350 tweets at A.Z. and her center. 60
Cassidy contended, inter alia, that § 2261A(2)(A) 61 “violates
52

Nos. 2:11-CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-DBH, 2012 WL 1714746 (D. Me.
May 15, 2012).
53
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 578 (“an enthroned tulku or reincarnate
master who was enthroned in 1988 as a reincarnate llama. . . the only
American-born female tulku”); see also MARTHA SHERRILL, THE BUDDHA FROM
BROOKLYN (Random House 1st ed., 2000).
54
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 579 n.6.
61
Which, again, makes it a crime “to kill, injure, harass, or place under
surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial
emotional distress to a person in another State or tribal jurisdiction or within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Pub. L. No.
109-62, § 114(a), 119 Stat. 2690, 2987 (2006).
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the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because it is
overbroad and implicates a broad range of otherwise
constitutionally protected speech.” 62
The government argued that § 2261A regulates conduct and
not speech. 63 The court dismissed the government’s argument,
citing United States v. O’Brien 64 for the proposition that even
content-neutral laws that proscribe a combination of speech and
conduct must still survive intermediate scrutiny. 65 Such a
restriction survives intermediate scrutiny if (1) it furthers an
important governmental interest, (2) such an interest is unrelated to
restricting speech, and (3) the restriction is no greater than
necessary to further such an interest. 66
The Cassidy court conceded that preventing tweets and blog
posts from inflicting emotional distress serves an important
interest; however, the court questioned whether such an interest
persists when the expression is conveyed in a public forum. The
tweets were not directed at a captive audience because the victims
may choose to ignore the blog posts or “unfollow” the offending
Twitter accounts. 67
The court noted too that emotionally distressing speech enjoys
constitutional protection when it touches upon political, religious,
or other matters of public concern. 68 “This is because ‘in public
debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.’” 69
The court reasoned that the defendant’s tweets did not fall
within any of the exceptions to First Amendment protection. 70 The
tweets were not integral to criminal conduct because they directly
related to a public figure; they challenged her efficacy as a
religious leader; and such speech—uncomfortable, anonymous,
62

Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
Id. at 585.
64
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
65
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 585.
66
Id. (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377) (omitting the first factor that the
O’Brien opinion listed).
67
Id. at 585-86 n.13.
68
Id., at 582.
69
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
70
Id. at 583.
63
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Internet speech addressing religious matters—is protected by the
First Amendment. 71 Nor were the tweets “true threats,” because
the government’s indictment failed to allege that the defendant had
threatened to inflict death or serious bodily harm. 72
The court held that § 2261A(2)(A) “sweeps in the type of
expression that the Supreme Court has consistently tried to
protect.” 73 Because the court concluded that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, it refrained from
determining whether § 2261A was invalid on its face. 74
2. Sayer: An Unsuccessful Overbreadth Argument
In 2012, the District Court of Maine, in United States v. Sayer,
faced a similar challenge to the interstate stalking statute. 75 In
Sayer, the defendant mounted an unsuccessful challenge to §
2261A. Of particular importance to this Article, the defendant’s
overbreadth argument failed. 76
The defendant (“Sayer”) was charged, inter alia, with violating
the interstate stalking statute because of alleged conduct that was
intended to “injure, harass, and cause substantial emotional distress
to a person in another state . . . .” 77 After his ex-girlfriend moved
out of state, Sayer allegedly used her name and personal
information in creating Internet advertisements and fake social
media accounts. 78 The advertisements implored men to visit the
victim for sex. 79 The advertisements were given an air of
authenticity by the defendant’s inclusion of sexual home videos he
had recorded of himself and the victim when they were dating. 80
As a result of the defendant’s actions, a number of strangers
71

Id.
Id.
73
Id. at 586 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964);
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
74
Id. at 587.
75
Nos. 2:11-CR-113-DBH, 2:11-CR-47-DBH, 2012 WL 1714746 (D. Me.
May 15, 2012).
76
Id. at *6–7.
77
Id. at *1.
78
Id. at *2.
79
Id.
80
Id.
72
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presented themselves at the victim’s door seeking sexual
intercourse, causing the victim terror and fear that she would be
raped. 81
The court explicitly distinguished Cassidy for its emphasis on
the public, religious nature of the tweets: “In Cassidy, the victim
was ‘not merely a private individual but rather an easily
identifiable public figure that leads a religious sect, and . . . many
of the Defendant’s statements relate to [the sect’s] beliefs and [the
victim]’s qualifications as a leader.’” 82 In contrast, Sayer’s alleged
conduct lacked the protective cloak of political or religious
speech. 83 Moreover, because Sayer’s speech was “integral to
criminal conduct,” the statute that criminalized such speech was
not unconstitutional as applied to him. 84
With respect to the facial overbreadth challenge, the court
explained that the first task must be to construe the statute in
question. The second task is to determine whether the statute
reaches too much protected speech. 85
After considering the text of § 2261A, the Sayer court
explained that the Supreme Court’s test for whether a statute
criminalizes a substantial amount of protected communicative
activity is based upon whether the statute, as applied to a number
of cases, reaches valid conduct more often than is necessary in
light of its legitimate purpose. 86
In applying this test, the Sayer court concluded that
§2261A covered constitutionally unprotected conduct and speech. 87
The court noted that if the statute contained any overbreadth, such
81
82

Id.
Id. at *3 (alterations in original) (quoting Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at

586).
83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008)).
86
Id. at *5 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)).
87
Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 378-79 (2004)
(“We fail to see how a law that prohibits interstate travel with the intent to kill,
injure, harass or intimidate has a substantial sweep of constitutionally protected
conduct. The same is true with respect to the prohibition of intentionally using
the [I]nternet in a course of conduct that places a person in reasonable fear of
death or seriously bodily injury. It is difficult to imagine what constitutionallyprotected political or religious speech would fall under these statutory
prohibitions.”) (citations omitted)).
84
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overbreadth was in criminalizing criminal conduct intended to
cause substantial emotional distress. 88 The court conceded that
such overbreadth, if any, is modest, not substantial, and that the
specific intent requirement of § 2261A will “dispose of most
concerns.” 89 The court also reasoned that the substantial emotional
distress precondition narrowed the statute’s application further. 90
Finally, the Sayer court reiterated that fears of a chilling
effect upon protected speech should attenuate when behavior shifts
“from pure speech toward conduct.” 91 “Rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is
not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily
associated with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating).” 92 In
the Sayer court’s opinion, no one familiar with the facts of the case
could reasonably believe that the Constitution forecloses Congress
from criminalizing such conduct. 93
B. A Difficult Task
A defense that includes an overbreadth challenge to the federal
cyberstalking statute must show that the statute is more than
merely overbroad; legislation, to be invalid here, must be
substantially overbroad compared to the legitimate functions it
proposes to serve. 94
A facial challenge is unlikely to succeed. The Supreme Court
has established this stringent threshold showing in part because it
deemed that any chilling effect upon speech, alone, should be

88

Id.
Id. at *6.
90
Id.
91
Id. at *7 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124 (2003)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
92
Id. (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
93
Id.
94
SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 6:6 (citing Broaderick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1970)); see also Gibson v. Mayor of City of
Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 228 (3d Cir. 2004) (“substantial overbreadth is
determined first by comparing the number of valid applications to the likelihood
and frequency of impermissible applications.”).
89
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insufficient to prohibit state action. 95
Instead, under this framework, a court must compare legitimate
and illegitimate applications of the law. 96 Accordingly, the
overbreadth doctrine loses power when the statute in question
forbids otherwise unprotected speech that the state has deemed
criminal conduct. 97
In Cassidy, the court held that the defendant’s tweets and blog
posts were speech addressing an issue of public concern—
regardless of their threatening nature. The United States argued
that Cassidy’s allegedly threatening tweets comprised a course of
criminal conduct. But in order to establish its burden of proof, the
government must show that the expression at issue constituted a
“true threat” or was “integral to criminal conduct.”
Notwithstanding this requirement, Sayer suggests that statutes
that criminalize true threats through the Internet are apt to be
upheld regardless of any constitutional challenge. 98 The
practitioner therefore must persuade the court that the defendant’s
speech failed to constitute a true threat. In the Ninth Circuit, this
task involves distinguishing the defendant’s speech from clear and
unambiguous threatening statements. 99 Thus, two scholars have
concluded, “[a] recurring theme in all of these cases is the
heightened willingness of courts to find that statements made on
the Internet are not protected when fiery rhetoric is conjoined with
specific identifying or instructional detail.”100 One can understand
further why the defendant’s actions in Sayer were not afforded the
First Amendment protection—by disclosing the victim’s personal
information, Sayer all but led strangers to the victim’s door.

95

SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 6:6 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971)).
96
Id.
97
Id. (citing Broaderick, 413 U.S. at 615).
98
See, e.g., United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2007)
(upholding a conviction against a computer technician for uttering true threats
through his website).
99
Id.
100
SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10:42 (emphasis in original).
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CONCLUSION
An attorney should consider the conduct prohibited by the
cyberstalking statute. Even if the court considers the restriction to
be content-neutral—or if the conduct falls within a narrow class of
unprotected speech—intermediate scrutiny should be applied.
The United States must, at the very least, show that (1) the
restriction furthers an important governmental interest, (2) said
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech,
and (3) that any restriction on speech is no greater than necessary
to further such an interest.
Finally, a defense attorney representing a person accused of
violating the federal cyberstalking statute must persuade the court
that the defendant’s speech is protected: that it is public, political,
or religious in nature; fails to comprise a true threat; and is not
integral to criminal conduct.
PRACTICE POINTERS
When raising a First Amendment defense to a federal
cyberstalking charge:


Emphasize that traditional First Amendment jurisprudence
applies even if the defendant utilized Twitter.



Formulate a tightly constructed argument that the statute
criminalizes protected speech.



Persuade the court that the statute is unconstitutional as
applied to the defendant.



Compare and contrast the legitimate and illegitimate sweep
of the statute to show that it is substantially overbroad on
its face.

